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Résumé :  L’article s’intéresse aux conséquences pour la cohésion territoriale et rurale d’une 
ouverture totale à la concurrence dans les services postaux. Dans un premier temps elle rappelle les 
caractéristiques particulières du secteur ainsi que le processus de déréglementation déjà engagé. 
Elle souligne les raisons des inquiétudes quant à la cohésion territoriale. Dans un deuxième temps 
elle analyse l’importance que la question territoriale prend en France. Le réseau actuel participe 
largement à l’animation des zones rurales. Sa protection a fait l’objet d’une loi particulière qui 




Abstract: The paper focuses on the impact of the Full Market Opening in postal services on the 
territorial cohesion. In the first section the paper recalls the specificities of the sector and the 
distance so far covered by deregulation. It underlines the reasons that raise worries. In the second 
section the paper analyses the territorial stake in France. Actual outlet network is notably extended 
and actively supports rural cohesion. It has been mostly preserved since WWII. A special law has 
introduced specific territorial obligations; however their funding is not entirely set.  
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FULL MARKET OPENING IN THE POSTAL SERVICES FACING THE SOCIAL AND TERRITORIAL 




(13a) The rural postal network in, inter alia, mountain and island regions, plays an 
essential role in integrating businesses into the national/global economy and in 
maintaining cohesion in social and employment terms (…) 
(14) They must take appropriate regulatory measures,  (…) to ensure that accessibility to 
postal services continues to satisfy the needs of users including, by ensuring, where 
appropriate, a minimum number of services at the same access point and, in particular, 
that there is no decline in the density of access points to postal services in rural and 
remote regions. 






The postal services are gradually being opened to standard competition and a new directive has 
planned to bring about full market opening for 2009 (COM 2006). As acknowledged by European 
directives, postal services play a great role in territorial and social cohesion. Until now, this cohesion 
has relied on cross-subsidisation between different users, but the entry of new competitors for 
standard mail should end this long-standing arrangement. Fears are growing that quality of delivery 
could might decline–especially in remote areas–, while prices for individual mail rise up.  
 
The paper first addresses the sources of concern. It explains the industrial specificities of the sector 
and prompts the main aspects of the European deregulation process in the postal services, with a 
special interest for France. Several goals defined by the directives seem contradictory, especially 
when competitors are skimming profitable clients. Second, the paper analyses the territorial issue and 
examines the caring measures envisioned for rural network. The paper particularly focuses on the 
French case where special territorial obligations have been set by law.    
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I. THE NEW FRAMEWORK OPENS NEW PROBLEMS 
OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS IMPLEMENTED SO FAR 
 
Sector specificities 
Postal service is a network as well as a labour industry, with, for instance, in France 280  000 
employees
1 generating 85% of total operational costs. 
Properly speaking, the postal network combines two parallel networks, one dedicated to collecting 
the mail (upstream network), the other one devoted to its delivery (downstream network). The first 
one has already been partially opened to competition with activities such as concentrators, sorters or 
routers. The second, which encompasses most of the charges and especially the fixed costs, will be 
confronted with full market opening in a close future. Postal services show most of the characteristics 
of a natural monopoly. Indeed, as long as the maximum capacity of delivery has not been reached, 
average costs are decreasing while traffic increases and marginal costs are null or close to zero. Not 
surprisingly, many researches since Panzar (1991) have confirmed economies of scale in the postal 
distribution activity (see Cazals 2004). 
 
  However, differing from the typical natural monopoly, the postal market is highly debatable 
(Toledano 2004 p. 234). This situation stems from two sources. First it derives from the fact that 
fixed costs are neither technical nor physical, but labour costs. As a consequence, contrary to the 
classic natural monopoly case, most network costs need to be paid recurrently (every month) and not 
once for all, therefore fixed costs are operative costs not investments. A defeated competitor who 
would be driven out of the market would not lose the high long-term charges he would have invested 
to arrange his network, but only the expenses that were required to operate its former activity. Hence 
sunk costs are minimal and entry is easy. Second, the scope of the network is easily adaptable; 
addressing the whole market is not the only option. Profitable niches can be created by reducing the 
frequency and the extent of the delivery: not all the mail needs to be delivered as quickly as possible, 
every working day and everywhere across a given territory. 
Postal activity is harmed by modern technological changes, as for example fax and e-mail, its future 
prospects are unclear. For instance in France since 1998, the growth rate of mail traffic has been 
below the GNP growth rate, traffic went even down for several years.  
Correspondence as a whole may be divided in bulk mail, generated by firms with advertisements, 
invoices, banking statements…, and separated (including individuals) mail. In France, bulk mail 
amounted in 2005 to a 58 % of overall correspondence, but firms as a whole generated more than 
 
1 Universal Postal Union 2005 data, corresponding full time workers.   
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80 % of the traffic (Arcep 2006, see graph n°1). Considering turnover, the weight of the firms’ mail 
is even more significant, since they engender more than 90 % of the mail income (Larcher 2003 
p.23). Demand is highly concentrated as 40 % of the letters turnover comes from only 80 companies 
(Hérisson 2007 p. 241).  
Finally, though individuals are still essential to postal service while being receivers, as senders they 




Shares of volume correspondence in France  





and small firms 
19% 
Non-routed 
bulk mail from 
large senders 25% 
Separated mail 
from firms 23% 




Deregulation in the postal services was launched by the European Commission in 1997 (box n°1). 
The process gradually reduces the share of postal activities that is covered by monopoly restraint. 
The most recent step in January 2006 dropped the reserved area to correspondence to 50 g. This 
evolution greatly alters the traditional organisational scheme.  
Postal operators often provide an equal service with a single price over an entire territory, even 
though costs fluctuate. Operators use their monopolistic situation to cross subsidise non profitable 
activities (mainly separated delivery in rural areas) by profitable ones (bulk mail delivery in urban 
regions). Even though tariffs are already partly adjusted for bulk mail, the end of monopoly would 
imply the end of cross subsidisation as the contestable market theory teaches it. Therefore, with the 
new market framework pushing to match costs and prices, incumbents should be driven to reduce the 





Box n°1: brief market opening timetable  
 
1989  Postal and telecommunication council invites the European Commission to prepare 
measures to develop postal services. Deregulation policy for speed delivery postal services was 
already opened.  
1992  Green Paper single market for postal services (COM/91/476).  
1997  1st Postal Directive (97/67/EC) launches the deregulation process, market opening     
                     for mail above 350 g scheduled for 1999. 
2002     2nd Postal Directive  (2002/39/EC). 
2003    2nd reduction of the "reserved area" (100 g). 
2006  3rd reduction of the "reserved area" (50 g). 
2006   Commission proposes the 3
rd directive Com (2006) 594 with Full Market Opening    
                     (FMO) for 2009. 
2007  (07/11) European Parliament votes to postpone the FMO to 2011. 
2007   (10/02) Final agreement sets FMO to January 2011 for EU 14 and 2013 for New  
                    Member States and Greece. 
 
 
In Sweden, where deregulation began in the early 90’s, prices for individuals underwent a sharp 
rise
2, but slightly decreased for firms (Andersson 2007 p. 11; Falkenhall & Kolmodin 2005 p. 23). At 
the same time, the number of post offices owned by Posten AB significantly decreased, especially in 
rural areas (PTS 2007, Falkenhall & Kolmodin 2005). In addition, between 1993 and 2006, 
employment declined by 33.5 % (PTS 2007 p.9). 
 
Universal Service Obligations 
One main fear is that social and territorial cohesion may be impaired by the opening. Aware of these 
worries the directives since 1997 have announced several principles (box n°2) and scheduled 
protective mechanisms. Indeed in addition to efficiency enhancement and orientation towards costs, 
they proclaim the necessity to preserve an undemanding access to all users with affordable prices. 
The 2002 directive in its recital 6 refers to preservation of the rural network and its role in social 
cohesion. Likewise preoccupations are to be found in the 2006 proposition. The impact report (SEC 
2006 p.20) also recalls that, “Postal services play an important role in underpinning territorial and 
social cohesion”. These objectives are included in the Universal Service Obligations (USO). 
 
Box n°2: excerpts of the 1997 directive recital 
 
n°11 Whereas it is essential to guarantee at Community level a universal postal service 
encompassing a minimum range of services of specified quality to be provided in all Member 
States at an affordable price for the benefit of all users, irrespective of their geographical 
location in the Community; 
n°12 Whereas the aim of the universal services is to offer all users easy access to the postal 
network through the provision, in particular, of a sufficient number of access points and by 
                                                           
2  From 35 to 43 % in real term depending on the type of mail. This increase is partly due to the introduction 
of VAT to mail and to a transitory failure of the regulation authority to monitor prices.   
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ensuring satisfactory conditions with regard to the frequency of collections and deliveries; 
whereas the provision of the universal service must meet the fundamental need to ensure 
continuity of operation, whilst at the same time remaining adaptable to the needs of users as 
well as guaranteeing them fair and non-discriminatory treatment; 
 
 
Universal Service is a service that should be available for all users, especially designed for 
individuals and Small and Medium Enterprises. This service includes quantified speed delivery goals 
(for d+1), affordable price, and coverage of all places on the territory at least five days a week. It 
applies to correspondence up to 2 kg, parcels at least up to 10 kg and registered mail. Directives do 
not impose the single pricing scheme, but should one country choose it, the Universal Service 
Provider (USP) should remain free to negotiate special discount tariffs for specific customers (art. 12 
al. 3, 1997th directive). So as to say that, after all, the single price pertains only to separate mail or 
likely to the bulk mail routes where no competitors entered. For the moment most historical operators 
are still protected by a partial monopoly.  
  In France until the end of 2005, deregulation (down to 100 g correspondence) only affected a 
small share of the correspondence, only 8.4 % of the traffic was concerned (graph I in annex). The 
consequence on income was more significant as it amounted to 17.6 %. Considering overall mail 
traffic, the share opened to competition in France, estimated to 39 % in 2003, went up to 46 % in 
January 2006 (La Poste activity reports). Nevertheless, after January 2006 the actual reserved area 
(under 50 g.) still covers 83.5 % of the letters amount and 73.4 % of its turnover (Arcep 2007). 
 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN WITH FULL MARKET OPENING? 
 
Skimming:  price competition facing Universal Service Obligations (USO) 
When new competitors enter the market, they skim the cream by mainly addressing bulk mail in 
densely populated areas. They may set a light network since this type of mail does not always need to 
be delivered every day and immediately. In consequence, entry does not imply high costs and even if 
the new entrant is less efficient that the incumbent it may propose lower prices (Bernard and alii 
2004). In these circumstances, it is worth noticing that the incumbent still roughly faces the same 
network costs, but collects fewer resources. The incumbent is therefore prone to lower its prices 
where competitors entered and raise them anywhere else; at the same time he is also prone to reduce 
its operating costs. The pressure on its costs may result in more mechanisation and greater efficiency, 
but also diminish network in rural areas, with fewer postal offices, fewer delivery days and higher 
prices. For instance, as quoted by Cazalda (2005) “outlying areas might receive service three days a 
week instead of the typical five or six currently. In other areas, Saturday service might be 
eliminated”.  
The evolving structure of prices actually transfers a definite share of the network costs borne by firms 
through bulk mail, towards individuals and separated mail. Yet this kind of response may in turn   
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reduce again incumbent’s resources, if some customers progressively leave its network considering 
prices are too high or access is too restricted. They may turn to phone, internet… a damaging spiral 
could be triggered off, with less traffic generating fewer resources and higher relative costs, inducing 
higher prices...This process is akin to the adverse selection scheme described by Akerloff (1970), for 
the second hand car market, and might initiate what Crew and Kleindorfer (2000) have named a 
“graveyard spiral”.  
Nevertheless, since for some destinations or types of mail, there are no substitutes (a significant 
amount of mail is unavoidable), minimal traffic should remain. Finally, theoretically competitive 
pressure tends to raise the price towards the cost of the most expensive routes (Cremer 2004 p. 13) 
and, taken as a whole, network and service shrink to a new lower quality/ price equilibrium. 
However, this process should not be allowed to go too far. Network is a club good, its utility rises 
with the number of connected costumers for a given period, which, from a postal point of view, 
derives from the combination of the total number of costumers, quickness and frequency of delivery. 
Let us remember that bulk and separated mail mainly use the same distribution network. Thus, if the 
network shrinks too severely, it could also disturb the delivery of a fraction of bulk mail (Cremer and 
alii 2007), and overall efficiency might decline.  
 
The above withdrawal spiral is nonetheless barred by the USO commitments. 
Since USO restricts the historical operator’s capacity of response to competition, its extent appears 
clearly a major concern for him. Depending on the level of obligations, the incumbent will or will not 
be able to freely downsize its network costs and conversely raise its prices. But its resources are to be 
reduced in any case. The universal service could thus induce an unfair financial load for the USP. 
Thus, all things being equal, USO should call for specific compensation
3. There is more to say, 
unexpectedly some USO constraints may have ambiguous effects or even counterfactual ones, 
namely the combination of single pricing and other requirements (PTS 2000). 
On the one hand, single price protects costumers from being overpriced when there is no competitor 
facing the USP; it also prevents him from subsidising predatory prices where competitors are. But on 
the other hand, as the single price must address all the territory, especially costly areas or routes, its 
level is indeed too high for low cost areas and routes. It therefore gives a true opportunity for 
competitors to enter the market. Moreover, it provides also the maximum price new entrants may 
charge and simultaneously determines their profit. As PTS summarises it: the single price « (…) 
prevents or at least makes it more difficult for Posten AB to cut prices only in areas where there is a 
local competitor » (PTS 2007 p. 9). Not surprisingly, Cremer & alii (2001 p. 116) find that: “Entry is 
 
3 Though essential, this paper is not addressing the compensation calculation debate (for a recent survey see 
Oxera 2007).   
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viable at all the considered scales when the incumbent has to price uniformly. When non-uniform 
pricing is allowed, on the other hand, only large scale entry is profitable”. 
 
What price increase for separated mail? 
Since separated mail price is to rise to compensate the fall of bulk mail volume & price, the question 
becomes: will the increase be affordable? If not, the USP will have to strongly squeeze its costs and 
possibly shrink its services in remote routes and areas. A very simple model may give a hint. 
 
Assume an efficient USP whose total turnover is: 
 (Pob . ao . Vob) + (Pos . bo . Vos)     1st period (monopoly)     (1) 
 (P1b . a1 . V1b) + (P1s . b1 . V1s)     2nd period (competition) (2)  
 
With P for price, V for volume of mail; b designate bulk mail s separated mail; a and b stand for the 
market shares for bulk and separated mail owned by the USP.  
Vob+ Vos is the total volume of mail, normalised to 1 for the first period.  
Let us also consider first period price Pob, Pos being equal to 1. 
 
First period, the incumbent is a monopoly 
 
 a o + bo = 2         total market shares 
 (ao .Vob) + (bo . Vos) = 1      total volume mail 
 (Pob . ao . Vob) + (Pos . bo . Vos) = 1   total turnover 
 
Second period, opening to competition 
 
 a 1 + b1 ≤  2     incumbent  market  shares   
 (a1 . V1b) + (b1 . V1s)        total incumbent volume mail 
 (P1b . a1 . V1b) + (P1s . b1 . V1s)     total incumbent turnover 
 
a1< ao expresses that a portion of the bulk mail is diverted by new entrants.   
P1b < Pob and P1s > Pos expresses the change in the price structure. 
 
The financial equilibrium constraint for the incumbent is (1) = (2): 
(P1b . a1 .V1b) + (P1s . b1 . V1s) = (Pob . ao . Vob) + (Pos . bo . Vos) (3) 
Let us find the value of P1s
(P1b . a1 .V1b) + (P1s .b1 . V1s) = 1     (4)   
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(P1s . b1 . V1s) = 1 - (P1b . a1 .V1b) 
P1s =  1 - (P1b . a1 .V1b)      ( 5 )  
     b1. V1s
 
Not surprisingly, the compensating price for separated mail depends on the turnover generated by 
bulk mail and the evolution of the volume of separated mail. 
Let us assume newcomers are only interested in bulk mail so that bo = b1 = 1. We may compute an 
estimate of P1s based on actual figures. 
 
Ö As a first step, let us suppose that the demand elasticity for separated mail is inelastic (V1s = Vos), 
hence V1s . b1 = Vos . bo 
 
P1s =  1 - (P1b . a1 .V1b)         (6) 
    bo . Vos
 
Considering the French case 
4  (bo . Vos) = 0,4; 
 
P1s =  1 - (P1b . a1 .V1b)      ( 7 )  
          0,4 
 
Let us set boundaries for P1b . a1 
The actual Swedish case tells us that after 14 years, the newcomer has gained 13 % of the bulk mail 
market (PTS 2007 p. 4). This latter figure may thus be taken as a bottom hypothesis. On the other 
hand, new entrants may at best be supposed to capture one third of the market. Senders are highly 
concentrated, thus a defection of a few senders may represent a large share of traffic. Besides, Cohen 
(2005) sees one third as an upper bound for Sweden. The bulk mail share left to incumbent therefore 
varies between 70 % and 87 % so that a1 ∈ [0,7; 0,87]. 
Price for bulk mail may decrease by 30 to 10 % (Andersson 2007), so let P1b ∈ [0,7; 0,9]. 
Hence altogether (P1b . a1) ∈ [0,49; 0,78] 
 
Results are displayed in table nb 1 and commented below. 
 
Ö As a second step, let us take into account the demand elasticity. Since most actual computed 
demand elasticity (εd/p) is negative (Cazals Florens 2004), separated volume owned by incumbent 
should be adversely affected. 
                                                           
4 Note that the  Swedish case is close with bulk = 0,7 (PTS 2007 p.9)   
  10
Let us calculate an estimate for b1 . V1s. using the lower figure of εd/p = - 0,2 (Cazals Florens 2004). 
Since a great deal of actual separated mail responds to unavoidable needs, let us assume that only the 
first 10 % price rise has an impact on demand. Hence b1 . V1s = 0,392 
5 and equation (5) becomes (8).  
 
P1s =  1 - (P1b . a1 .V1b)      ( 8 )  
          0,392 
 
The dissimilarity between (7) and (8) is not large enough to produce large discrepancies on P1s prices.  
However, P1s increases more, fuelling the potential “graveyard spiral”. 
 
 
TABLE N° 1 
Necessary P1s separated price level compensating entry,  
given various options (Pos = 1) 
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100 %) 
















loss.  (first 
period = 
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(a1 . V1b) + 
(b1 . V1s) 
(first period 
= 1)  





(a1 . V1b) + 
(b1 . V1s) 
(first 















100 %  1,80  1,32  0,80 0,92  1,83  1,35 
105 %  1,76  1,27  0,82 0,95  1,79 1,29 
110 %  1,73  1,21  0,84 0,97  1,76 1,23 
115 %  1,69 1,15  0,86 1,0 1,72 1,17 
120 %  1,65 1,09  0,88 1,03  1,68 1,11 
 
 
Our rough estimate shows that in a country like France, where bulk mail represents 60 % of total 
mail, a drop of 13 % in the bulk market owned by the historical operator associated with a drop of 
10 % of bulk mail prices, would call, everything being equal, for an increase of 32 % in separated 
mail prices. With an optimistic rise of bulk mail volume by 20 %, prices of separated mail should 
still need to increase by 9 %. 
In the worst hypothetic case, a drop of one third in the price and the share of the bulk mail of the 
incumbent would request an increase of more than 60 % for separated mail price.  
 
These figures are harsh. They stem from a joint fall in market share and price of bulk mail, which in 
turn influences the incumbent’s remaining volume. The cumulated phenomenon dramatically 
                                                           
5 1*(0,4 * (1-0,02))   
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amplifies the consequence of a sole market loss. The data are nonetheless consistent with the 30 % 
increase Posten AB introduced in 1996 on separated letters, a few years after Full Market Opening. 
Even if it was due to a loophole in price monitoring; this rise was alleged to be a response to growing 
costs (PTS 2007 p. 8).  
Sure enough, these estimates do not take into account several important parameters as for instance, 
productivity gains; employment downsizing, restructuring of the network… that could ease the 
shock. Nonetheless, we may interpret the figures as an upper approximation of the productivity gains 
constraint that will spur from market opening.  
 
 
Finally, the combination of competition opening with USO and single pricing tends to dramatically 
affect USP and confirms fears for territorial cohesion. As Cazalda (2005 p.19) puts it: “This implies 
that some high-cost regions could only be served in a profitable way by reducing the quality of the 
service”.  
 
II. THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE IN FRANCE 
 
The new competition framework will put a strain on the USP. However its true impact depends on 
many factors, the importance of which varies from one country to another (Oxera 2007, PWC 2006). 
 
Let us summarise and classify these factors in three clusters (box n°3). Obviously, consequences of 
the full market opening depend on the magnitude of entries. Consequently, the first cluster deals with 
attractiveness. The second one is the capacity of reaction of the incumbent and the third one the 
potential unbalance created by the confrontation of the new framework and territorial heterogeneity.  
 
It is not of our intent to address all of the three clusters since the concern of this paper is the shock 
that will face the USP pertaining to territorial cohesion, not his ability to overcome it. Therefore, the 
paper does not take into account factors as structure of the employment or share of mechanised 
sorting… (see PWC 2006, table p. 38). This paper merely focuses on the attractiveness of the country 
and the potential unbalance. Attractiveness raises the intensity of competition and the more 
contrasted the costs are, the more harmful cream skimming is.   
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Box n°3: Key impact parameters to assess FMO 
 
Attractiveness  
Size of the national market and potential growth (number of mail per inhabitant, total turnover), 
Relative importance of letter mail vs. bulk 
Postal scale urbanisation (percentage of urban population) 
 
Capacity of reaction of the incumbent  
Labour and legacy costs,  
Innovation capacities (automation) and network costs (incl. franchising of counters) 
Actual prices and efficiency (profit) 
Size of scale economy 
Demand elasticity, switching elasticity   
 
Potential unbalance  
Type and extent of the USO (single pricing, level of quality requirements) 
Network delivery costs: extent of the network, surface of the country, range of costs between 
rural and urban routes 
Evenness of the density of population  






Attractiveness comes from the combination of a huge overall market, a rather high volume of mail 
per inhabitant and a high share of urban clients easily addressable. Considering Union Postale 
Universelle and Eurostat data, France is fairly attractive for entry (table n°2). The country appears to 
be the third European postal market, far above the fourth one; with a rather high level of 
correspondence per inhabitant and urban population ratio. As a matter of fact in spring 2007, 14 
competitors were already registered by the regulation authority. The area of Ile de France, with more 
than 20 millions contiguous people and a high purchasing power, is one of the most attractive in 
Europe, with a population well above greater London’s (one). A fierce competition may be forecast 
enforcing the new price structure. 





Postal market data for EU 15 
 













Germany 259,25 389,77 88,00 14  076 
Great 
Britain  348,43 349,65 91,30 11 847 
France 289,99 475,12 76,30 11  300 
Italy 117,63 118,89 85,90 3  973 
Sweden 331,32 331,32 33,20 2  753 
Netherlands 315,30 359,65 96,90 2  660 
Spain 120,24 146,60 75,60 1  854 
Austria 121,44 458,83 65,40 1  701 
Denmark 194,86 511,42 67,60 1  482 
Finland 158,51 332,25 49,40 1  035 
Portugal 96,27 96,27 78,80 648 
Ireland 120,30 558,05 56,90 515 
Greece 50,43 63,66 69,20 401 
Luxembourg 226,02 226,02 80,70 146 






















UPU data 2005 except turnover Eurostat 2004, due to paucity of data for some countries, total mail is not 





Concerning potential unbalance, French laws (2005, 2007) implemented an enhanced version of 
USO, with a special interest for rural protection that creates strong constraints on USP.  
 
When transposing the directives, France chose to take the wider conception of the USO (box n°3). As 
a consequence the Universal Service covers parcels up to 20 kg; delivery every working day, mail 
should also be brought to the home of individual or collective costumers. Single pricing appeared as 
part of the USO in 2007, not for bulk mail.  
 
 
Box n°3: Universal Service Obligations in France (05/01/2007 decree) 
 
Extent: universal service pertains to letters up to 2kg and parcels up to 20 kg. 
Delivery: delivery is effective at home for each individual or firm. Except extraordinary 
circumstances, the service runs every working day. 
Accessibility: at least 99% of the national population and 95% of the population of each district 
(“département”) should be less than 10 kilometres from a postal contact point. Every city with   
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more than 10 000 inhabitants gets at least one postal contact outlet, plus one by segment of 
20 000 inhabitants.   
Prices: except for bulk mail, a single price applies for all the metropolitan territory. 
Press delivery: newspapers and press documents recognised by the Press Parity Commission are 
delivered complying USO. The tariff structure should support pluralism. 
 
 
Territorial concerns  
France is one of the largest countries of EU in surface and in population with 551 000 km² and more 
than 60 millions inhabitants, however its population density is rather modest (table n°3). Moreover, 
even if the population is not as sparsely distributed as Finland or Sweden, France has still a 
comparatively significant share of its population living in rural areas –well over EUR 15 average– as 
well as a great number of independent communes (table n°3). As a consequence the territorial 
concern is a major one; its magnitude may be observed on the two levels of postal heterogeneity and 




















Sweden 20  67      290  1 980   n/a 
Finland 16  51      446  1 276  -54% 
Ireland 60  43    3 440  1 570  -21% 
Austria 98  35    2 381  1 947  -25% 
Denmark 125  32      271  945  -20% 
Greece 84  31    6 130  2 093  71% 
Spain 90  24    8 108  3 291  -48% 
France 98  24  36 678  17 008    0% 
Portugal 115  21  4 257  2 889  -51% 
Luxembourg 193  19     118  107  2% 
Italy 196  14    8 100  13 831  -4% 
Germany 231  12  13 176  12 671  -22% 
Great 
Britain 
247  9  10 679  14 376 
-25% 
Belgium 344  5      589  1 409  -29% 
Netherland 402  3      489  3 191  -2% 
USA ***  31 21      /  37 579**  -6% 
Source UPU, * Eurostat (Boscacci 1999) Population of local communities 
with density below 100 inhabitants/km2 (EUR 15 = 17,5 %). *** Various 
sources not comparable with other data. ** Cohen 2006. 





Due to a combination of spatial centralisation and partial rural exodus, the population is fairly 
unequally distributed on the territory as compared to other similar countries in Europe (see map in 
annex), thus postal market is uneven. Barthélémy & Toledano (2004 p. 99) have partitioned the 
French postal market in three categories: dynamic areas, medium areas and rural or unprivileged 
areas. The third cluster encompasses 43,5 % of receivers with only an average of 189 letters per 
person per year, on the opposite side, in the dynamic group (20 % of receivers) nearly 2,6 times more 
letters (489) are delivered. Overall traffic rises with the size of towns from a factor 1 in rural areas to 
1.5 in the Paris region, and the number of letters rises from 1 to 2.1. 
Large unevenness among clients strongly affects distribution costs. A study by Roy (2004 p. 168) 
underlines that delivery costs may vary from a factor 1 to 32, depending on the particular population 
density and the postal traffic of a given area. In fact, actual average delivery costs are estimated to 
range from 1 to 3 between urban and rural areas in France. The obligation to deliver mail at home has 
also a great impact on rural costs. According to Bernard (2004 p.  187) this kind of delivery 
contributes to noticeably lessening rural postal density. For instance, even if in the USA overall 
population density is lower than in France, postal density is higher. This phenomenon stems from the 
fact that mail is delivered along roads in the USA; postmen may distribute letters without leaving 
their car. Consequently: “delivery costs are more heterogeneous in France than in the U.S. Ceteris 
paribus, France is more vulnerable to inefficient entry than the U.S” (Bernard 2004 p. 197). 
 
A large and diverse outlet network  
As part of a historic legacy and of political requirements, the total number of outlets has not much 
evolved since the Second World War. The French government even demanded to postpone any 
postal outlet closure in 1993. As Senator  Larcher’s 1997 report recalls: “postal presence on the 
territory is above all a social obligation”. France is the only European country where the number of 
outlets remained still during the market opening period (table n°3).  
The French postal network is certainly among the very few that in EU devotes as much importance to 
rural areas. It encompasses approximately 17 000 outlets covering 12 000 towns, over a total number 
of 36 000. Nearly 60 % of outlets are in towns with less than 2 000 inhabitants (table n°4). On the 
opposite only 17 % are found in towns of more than 10 000 inhabitants.  
For the moment, the network is amply covering rural areas. The average access distance to a postal 
outlet in rural areas is 6.5 kilometres and very few inhabitants are out of a 20 minutes drive reach 
from a postal outlet. The network is clearly shaped to support territorial cohesion, thus cross 
subsidisation is still essential. Indeed, on one end, two third of the outlets generates only 10 % of the 
total turnover of La Poste, while on the other end the last third generates 90 % (Comptes 2003 





Population and postal outlets distribution in France 
  Cour des comptes 2003 p.126 & Larcher 2003 p. 69;  
Categories 
















< 1000  28 004  9 388 854 16,04 8  39
1000 
to 1999  4 052  5 645 132 9,65 10  21
2 000 
to 9 999 
3 657  14 836 376 25,35 28  23
> 10 000  852  28 650 326 48,96 54  17
  36 565  58 520 688 100,00 100  100
 
 
To preserve this situation, the USO imposes the USP to comply with accessibility criteria, which as 
compared to several countries in Europe are quite high, given district (“départements”) requirements 
(annex). Moreover a 2005 law, pertaining to territorial cohesion, states (art. n°2) that: “La Poste 
contributes, through its network, to territorial cohesion and development in addition to its USO”, It 
demands La Poste to maintain more offices than should be necessary for efficient business purpose 
(box n°5) and adds several requirements to USO. The accessibility criterion rises to: “10% of the 
population of a district (“départment”) may not be beyond 5 kilometres or 20 minutes reach from a 
postal contact point”. As it can easily be understood, the aim of the law is more or less to preserve the 




Box n°5: Special territorial cohesion regulation, (20/05/2005 act) 
 
Excepted in special circumstances, 10 % of the population of a district (“départment”) may not 
be beyond 5 kilometres or 20 minutes reach from a postal contact point.  
A special “departement” council for postal territorial localisation gives advices on the location 
of postal contact points. 
 
A special territorial compensation fund is set to finance the cost of the territorial cohesion. Its 
resources come from a discount on local taxes. Universal Service Provider obtains an 85 % 
rebate on community taxes. 
 
 
Several estimates have been carried out to assess the impact on number and costs of various sizes of 
the network (table n°5). Compared to a business-oriented network, USO rises the number of postal 
outlets by 1 500 to 3 000, and costs by roughly 250 million Euros. The special territorial cohesion   
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requirement adds nearly 8 000 more outlets and 500 million Euros. The total value of territorial 




Universal service and the cost of rural postal presence in France 
 
 
Networks Number  of  postal 
outlets 
Cost in 2001 (Millions 
of Euros) 
Actual network  13649 offices + 







6000 (3000 offices 
and 3000 agencies)  1 229 (2) 
USO compliant 
network  
7500* to 9000 
(6000 offices and 
3000 agencies) 
1 514 (2) 





Estimated charges: 250 
millions € for USO and 
500 millions for 





















Source :  (1) Proriol 2006. p. 15, (2) Cour des Comptes (2003) p.128-130, * Hérisson 2007 p. 247  
 
 
In accordance with the directives, the law forecasts to set compensation funds for USO and has 
already planned a special territorial fund. This latter fund is financed by a discount on local taxes. 
Universal Service Provider obtains an 85  % rebate on community taxes. However this fiscal 
exemption amounts only to 130 millions as compared to the 500 millions costs estimated. Until now 
since the reserved domain is maintained for mail up to 50 g. there has been no need to go further on, 
but the next opening step stirs true uncertainties. 
 
France combines several peculiar features. Its market is attractive, but quite uneven; the structure of 
costs is heterogeneous. Enhanced USO jointed with special territorial requirements will make it 
uneasy for the USP to fairly compete with newcomers. A well defined compensation seems 
necessary. 
 




Since the previous openings where actually of little significance, the Full Market Opening planned 
for 2011 will represent a large leap for postal operators. It will bring along a strong strain for the 
cohesion and territorial goal as well as for universal service obligations, especially when single 
pricing is chosen. As points Oxera (2007 p. 19) in the new context “the issue of financing the 
universal service becomes critical”. Hence, historical operators will have fierce incentives to find a 
way to reduce the scope of the Universal Service Obligations and raise prices for individual mail. 
The paper advocates that entry of new competitors and the corresponding reduction of revenues of 
the incumbent operator would call for a reduction of the coverage and the quality of the incumbent’s 
service. The strain will especially affect rural and deprived areas. This result is especially true for 
countries where the density of population is uneven, with significant discrepancies between areas, 
where postal delivery average per inhabitant is high, and legacy costs significant (PWC 2006). In 
these circumstances, several competitors will be prone to enter the market, as well as prosperous 
niches will be available. France is roughly matching these criteria. In addition, compared to similar 
countries, the French postal service network is over covering rural areas (Larcher 2002 & 2003), and 
actual USO translated requirements set up a strong burden for the Universal Service Provider (La 
Poste). The paper didn’t address the issue of the designation and securing of the compensation fund 
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GRAPH N° IA ET IB 
French postal market in volume for 2006-2005 (billions) 
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TABLE N°I 
USO ACCESSIBILITY CRITERION FOR POSTAL SERVICES IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
* Proriol 2006 p.15, Hérisson 2007 p. 247 




95 % of population 
should be less than 
5 km from a postal 
contact point on a 
national level 
100 % of 
population less 
than 2 km from a 
contact point in 
urban areas  
100 % population 
less than 5 km from 





99 % of 
population 
should be less 
than 10 
kilometres from 
a postal contact 




95 % of population 
less than 10 km 
from a contact 
point for every 120 
postal code zones  
At least one 
contact point for 
every 2.000 
inhabitants zone, 
one office for 80 
km2 in rural areas  
At least a contact 
point for every 
50.000 inhabitants 
for cities over 
50.000 inhabitants  
95% of the 
population of 
each district 
should be less 
than 10 
kilometres from 
a postal contact 
point. 
Every city with 
more than 10 000 
inhabitants 
deserves at least 
one postal 
contact outlet, 










At least 12.000 
contact points of 
which 5.000 
owned 
2.194 office of 
which 902 with full 
service  
7500 to 9000 







points, 97 % 
franchised  (only 
590 owned post 
offices)  
14.000 contact 
points of which 
5.800 owned  
2.200 contact points  
17 028  contact 
points, of which 
14 000 owned 





Urban areas in France 
 
 
Ministère de l’intérieur et de l’aménagement du territoire/DGCL Publications : « Les Collectivités 
locales en chiffres 2007 » p. 16,               
PAPIERS 
 




D.R. n° 1  "Bertrand Oligopoly with decreasing returns to scale",  
 J. Thépot, décembre 1993 
 
D.R. n° 2  "Sur quelques méthodes d'estimation directe de la structure par terme 
    des taux d'intérêt", P. Roger - N. Rossiensky, janvier 1994 
 
D.R. n° 3  "Towards a Monopoly Theory in a Managerial Perspective", 
   J. Thépot, mai 1993 
 
D.R. n° 4  "Bounded Rationality in Microeconomics", J. Thépot, mai 1993 
 
D.R. n° 5  "Apprentissage Théorique et Expérience Professionnelle",  
     J. Thépot, décembre 1993 
 
D.R. n° 6  "Stratégic Consumers in a Duable-Goods Monopoly", 
  J. Thépot, avril 1994 
 
D.R. n° 7  "Vendre ou louer ; un apport de la théorie des jeux", J. Thépot, avril 1994 
 
D.R. n° 8  "Default Risk Insurance and Incomplete Markets", 
    Ph. Artzner - FF. Delbaen, juin 1994 
 
D.R. n° 9  "Les actions à réinvestissement optionnel du dividende", 
C.   Marie-Jeanne - P. Roger, janvier 1995 
 
D.R. n°  10  "Forme optimale des contrats d'assurance en présence de coûts 
    administratifs pour l'assureur", S. Spaeter, février 1995 
 
D.R. n° 11  "Une procédure de codage numérique des articles", 
        J. Jeunet, février 1995 
 
D.R. n° 12  Stabilité d'un diagnostic concurrentiel fondé sur une approche 
    markovienne du comportement de rachat du consommateur", 
N. Schall, octobre 1995 
 
D.R. n° 13  "A direct proof of the coase conjecture", J. Thépot, octobre 1995 
 
D.R. n° 14  "Invitation à la stratégie", J. Thépot, décembre 1995 
 
D.R. n° 15  "Charity and economic efficiency", J. Thépot, mai 1996 
 D.R. n° 16  "Princing anomalies in financial markets and non linear pricing rules", 
P.  Roger, mars 1996 
 
D.R. n° 17  "Non linéarité des coûts de l'assureur, comportement de prudence de 
    l'assuré et contrats optimaux", S. Spaeter, avril 1996 
 
D.R. n° 18  "La valeur ajoutée d'un partage de risque et l'optimum de Pareto : une 
    note", L. Eeckhoudt - P. Roger, juin 1996 
 
D.R. n° 19  "Evaluation of Lot-Sizing Techniques : A robustess and Cost Effectiveness 
    Analysis", J. Jeunet, mars 1996 
 
D.R. n° 20  "Entry accommodation with idle capacity", J. Thépot, septembre 1996 
 
D.R. n° 21  "Différences culturelles et satisfaction des vendeurs : Une comparaison 
    internationale", E. Vauquois-Mathevet - J.Cl. Usunier, novembre 1996 
 
D.R. n° 22  "Evaluation des obligations convertibles et options d'échange",  
A. Schmitt - F. Home, décembre 1996 
 
D.R n° 23  "Réduction d'un programme d'optimisation globale des coûts et  
    diminution du temps de calcul, J. Jeunet, décembre 1996 
 
D.R. n° 24  "Incertitude, vérifiabilité et observabilité : Une relecture de la 
    théorie de l'agence", J. Thépot, janvier 1997 
 
D.R. n° 25  "Financement par augmentation de capital avec asymétrie d'information : 
    l'apport du paiement du dividende en actions",  
C.   Marie-Jeanne, février 1997 
 
D.R. n° 26  "Paiement du dividende en actions et théorie du signal", 
C.   Marie-Jeanne, février 1997 
 
D.R. n° 27  "Risk aversion and the bid-ask spread", L. Eeckhoudt - P. Roger, avril 1997 
 
D.R. n° 28  "De l'utilité de la contrainte d'assurance dans les modèles à un risque et à 
    deux risques", S. Spaeter, septembre 1997 
 
D.R. n° 29  "Robustness and cost-effectiveness of lot-sizing techniques under revised  
    demand forecasts", J. Jeunet, juillet 1997 
 
D.R. n° 30  "Efficience du marché et comparaison de produits à l'aide des méthodes  
    d'enveloppe (Data envelopment analysis)", S. Chabi, septembre 1997 
 
D.R. n° 31  "Qualités de la main-d'œuvre et subventions à l'emploi : Approche  
    microéconomique", J. Calaza - P. Roger, février 1998 
 
D.R n° 32  "Probabilité de défaut et spread de taux : Etude empirique du marché français", 
M. Merli - P. Roger, février 1998 
 
 
D.R. n° 33  "Confiance et Performance : La thèse de Fukuyama",      J.Cl. Usunier - P. Roger, avril 1998 
 
D.R. n° 34  "Measuring the performance of lot-sizing techniques in uncertain 
    environments", J. Jeunet - N. Jonard, janvier 1998 
 
D.R. n° 35  "Mobilité et décison de consommation : premiers résultas dans un cadre  
    monopolistique", Ph. Lapp, octobre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 36  "Impact du paiement du dividende en actions sur le transfert de richesse et la  
    dilution du bénéfice par action", C. Marie-Jeanne, octobre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 37  "Maximum resale-price-maintenance as Nash condition", J. Thépot,  
novembre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 38  "Properties of bid and ask prices in the rank dependent expected utility model", 
  P. Roger, décembre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 39  "Sur la structure par termes des spreads de défaut des obligations »,  
 Maxime Merli / Patrick Roger, septembre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 40  "Le risque de défaut des obligations : un modèle de défaut temporaire de  l’émetteur", 
Maxime Merli, octobre 1998 
 
D.R. n° 41  "The Economics of Doping in Sports", Nicolas Eber / Jacques Thépot, 
février 1999 
 
D.R. n° 42  "Solving  large  unconstrained  multilevel lot-sizing problems using a hybrid genetic 
algorithm", Jully Jeunet, mars 1999 
 
D.R n° 43  "Niveau général des taux et spreads de rendement", Maxime Merli, mars 1999 
 
D.R. n° 44  "Doping in Sport and Competition Design", Nicolas Eber / Jacques Thépot,  
septembre 1999 
 
D.R. n° 45  "Interactions dans les canaux de distribution", Jacques Thépot, novembre 1999 
 
D.R. n° 46  "What sort of balanced scorecard for hospital", Thierry Nobre, novembre 1999 
 
D.R. n° 47  "Le contrôle de gestion dans les PME", Thierry Nobre, mars 2000 
 
D.R. n° 48  ″Stock timing using genetic algorithms", Jerzy Korczak – Patrick Roger,  
avril 2000 
 
D.R. n° 49  "On the long run risk in stocks : A west-side story", Patrick Roger, mai 2000 
 
D.R. n° 50  "Estimation des coûts de transaction sur un marché gouverné par les ordres : Le cas des 
composantes du CAC40", Laurent Deville, avril 2001 
 
D.R. n° 51  "Sur une mesure d’efficience relative dans la théorie du portefeuille de Markowitz", 
Patrick Roger / Maxime Merli, septembre 2001 
 D.R. n° 52  "Impact de l’introduction du tracker Master Share CAC 40 sur la relation de parité call-
put", Laurent Deville, mars 2002 
 
D.R. n° 53  "Market-making, inventories and martingale pricing", Patrick Roger / Christian At / 
Laurent Flochel, mai 2002 
 
D.R. n° 54  "Tarification au coût complet en concurrence imparfaite", Jean-Luc Netzer / Jacques 
Thépot, juillet 2002 
 
D.R. n° 55  "Is time-diversification efficient for a loss averse investor ?", Patrick Roger,  
janvier 2003 
 
D.R. n° 56  “Dégradations de notations du leader et effets de contagion”, Maxime Merli / Alain 
Schatt, avril 2003 
 
D.R. n° 57  “Subjective evaluation, ambiguity and relational contracts”, Brigitte Godbillon,  
juillet 2003 
 
D.R. n° 58  “A View of the European Union as an Evolving Country Portfolio”,  
Pierre-Guillaume Méon / Laurent Weill, juillet 2003 
 
D.R. n° 59  “Can Mergers in Europe Help Banks Hedge Against Macroeconomic Risk ?”,  
Pierre-Guillaume Méon / Laurent Weill, septembre 2003 
 
D.R. n° 60  “Monetary policy in the presence of asymmetric wage indexation”, Giuseppe Diana / 
Pierre-Guillaume Méon, juillet 2003 
 
D.R.  n°  61  “Concurrence bancaire et taille des conventions de services”, Corentine Le Roy, 
novembre 2003 
 
D.R. n° 62  “Le petit monde du CAC 40”, Sylvie Chabi / Jérôme Maati 
 
D.R.  n°  63  “Are Athletes Different  ? An Experimental Study Based on the Ultimatum Game”, 
Nicolas Eber / Marc Willinger 
 
D.R. n° 64  “Le rôle de l’environnement réglementaire, légal et institutionnel dans la défaillance des 
banques : Le cas des pays émergents”, Christophe Godlewski, janvier 2004 
 
D.R.  n°  65  “Etude de la cohérence des ratings de banques avec la probabilité de défaillance 
bancaire dans les pays émergents”, Christophe Godlewski, Mars 2004 
 
D.R. n° 66  “Le comportement des étudiants sur le marché du téléphone mobile : Inertie, captivité 
ou fidélité ?”, Corentine Le Roy, Mai 2004 
 
D.R. n° 67  “Insurance and Financial Hedging of Oil Pollution Risks”, André Schmitt / Sandrine 
Spaeter, September, 2004 
 
D.R.  n°  68  “On the Backwardness in Macroeconomic Performance of European Socialist 
Economies”, Laurent Weill, September, 2004 
 
D.R. n° 69  “Majority voting with stochastic preferences : The whims of a committee are smaller 
than the whims of its members”, Pierre-Guillaume Méon, September, 2004  
D.R. n° 70  “Modélisation de la prévision de défaillance de la banque : Une application aux banques 
des pays émergents”, Christophe J. Godlewski, octobre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 71  “Can bankruptcy law discriminate between heterogeneous firms when information is 
incomplete ? The case of legal sanctions”, Régis Blazy, october 2004 
 
D.R. n° 72  “La performance économique et financière des jeunes entreprises”,  
Régis Blazy/Bertrand Chopard, octobre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 73  “Ex Post Efficiency of bankruptcy procedures : A general normative framework”,  
Régis Blazy / Bertrand Chopard, novembre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 74  “Full cost pricing and organizational structure”, Jacques Thépot, décembre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 75  “Prices as strategic substitutes in the Hotelling duopoly”, Jacques Thépot,  
décembre 2004 
 
D.R. n° 76  “Réflexions sur l’extension récente de la statistique de prix et de production à la santé et 
à l’enseignement”, Damien Broussolle, mars 2005 
 
D. R. n° 77  “Gestion  du  risque  de  crédit  dans  la banque  : Information hard, information soft et 
manipulation ”, Brigitte Godbillon-Camus / Christophe J. Godlewski 
 
D.R. n° 78   “Which Optimal Design For LLDAs”, Marie Pfiffelmann 
 
D.R. n° 79  “Jensen and Meckling 30 years after : A game theoretic view”, Jacques Thépot 
 
D.R.  n°  80  “Organisation artistique et dépendance à l’égard des ressources”, Odile Paulus, 
novembre 2006 
 
D.R. n° 81  “Does collateral help mitigate adverse selection ? A cross-country analysis”,  
Laurent Weill –Christophe J. Godlewski, novembre 2006 
 
D.R. n° 82  “Why do banks ask for collateral and which ones ?”, Régis Blazy - Laurent Weill, 
décembre 2006 
 
D.R. n° 83  “The peace of work agreement : The emergence and enforcement of a swiss labour 
market institution”, D. Broussolle, janvier 2006. 
 
D.R. n° 84  “The new approach to international trade in services in view of services specificities : 
Economic and regulation issues”, D. Broussolle, septembre 2006. 
 
D.R. n° 85  “Does the consciousness of the disposition effect increase the equity premium” ?,  
P. Roger, juin 2007 
 
D.R. n° 86  “Les déterminants de la décision de syndication bancaire en France”, Ch. J. Godlewski 
 
D.R. n° 87  “Syndicated loans in emerging markets”, Ch. J. Godlewski / L. Weill, mars 
2007 
 
D.R. n° 88  “Hawks and loves in segmented markets : A formal approach to competitive aggressiveness”, Claude d’Aspremont / R. Dos Santos Ferreira / J. Thépot,  
mai 2007 
 
D.R. n° 89  “On the optimality of the full cost pricing”, J. Thépot, février 2007 
 
D.R.  n°  90  “SME’s main bank choice and organizational structure : Evidence from 
France”, H. El Hajj Chehade / L. Vigneron, octobre 2007 
  
D.R n° 91  “How to solve St Petersburg Paradox in Rank-Dependent Models” ?,  
M. Pfiffelmann, octobre 2007 
 
D.R.  n°  92  “Full market opening in the postal services facing the social and territorial 
cohesion goal in France”, D. Broussolle, novembre 2007. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 